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STATEHENT OF THE CASE 
This is a brief in opposition to an appeal from an 
order revoking Appellant's driver's license. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\vER COURT 
On May 17, 1977, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
reviewed the order of the Department of Public Safety revoking 
Appellant's driver's license and upheld the order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the lower court's determination 
affirmed. 
STATE11ENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 26, 19~7, Appellant was arrested and charged 
with driving under the influence of alcohol. On being brought 
to tre police station, Appellant was asked to submit to a breath-
alyzer test after being informed of the implied consent law. 
Appellant refused to take the breathalyzer test. 
Respondent, Georgia R. Shaw, reviewed these facts, took 
testimony, and revoked Appellant's license effective March 19, 
1977. The District Court Judge then found that the petitioner 
unreasonably refused to submit to a chemical test to determine 
the alcoholic content of his blood pursuant to the laws of the 
State of Utah (R, 10). 
ARGUEMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST lvAS UN-
REASONABLE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT. 
This court in Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (1975) 
~ stated a well-known principle of appellate law, "lve do not re-
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verse the trial judge unless he clearly ~oes violence to 
the , 
as they relate to his findings." The facts of this case 
and ~ 
applicable law clearly support the Distirct Court's detern:inat_ 
that Appellant's refusal was unreasonable. 
Respondent disagrees w~th the statement in A PPellant• 
brief that "The alternate test (blood) was readily available" 
(No transcipt was designated by the Appellant). 
that the breathalyzer test was readily available 
The facts,, 
•er, 
while the blo: 
alcohol test was not. The officer made that clear to the Ap-
pellant, explained it, read him the statute and then designatec 
the test to be t&ken. The trial court obviously believed t~u 
facts. 
The Appellant, would put the shoe on the >·n·ong foot 
and have the officer tried for unreasonableness. The officer's 
actions are not on re-trial. The only reason given and argued: 
the Appellant for refusing the breathalyzer test is that he be-
lieved it to be unreliable. Under these facts, if tte officH 
were on trial, he would have acted reasonably in request.i~~ 
breathalyzer test anyway. So found the trial court and we ask 
this court to uphold that finding. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID IN FACT UNREASONABLY REFUSE ~0 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 41-6-44.10. 
Appellant • s brief attempts to use Elliot v. Doriur., 
557 p. 2d 759 (1976), to argue the position that if the order 
-2-
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·:Nking Ap~ellant's license is not overturned, this court 
~ld be granting police officers absolute power to determine which 
~est is to be us<d. Elliot seems to support this necessary 
,esult and in no way supports the Appellant's case. In fact, the 
holding of Elliot could dictate the necessary outcome of the case 
at tar, ie., that since tte alternate test was not readily avail-
ilile, Appellant's refusal to take the available breathalyzer test 
,:as unreasonable, whether available or not. By statute, the 
test requested is presumed to be a reliable and reasonable one. 
Appellant contends his refusal was not unreasonable 
c'ue to his fear of the unreliability of the breathalyzer test 
a~ that he should be given the choice. This court in Elliot 
stated: 
In construing the meaning of reasonable 
cause, in this subsection, ((c) of Utah 
Code Annotated 44-6-44.10), it is signi-
ficant the person is granted the right to 
submit to a 'chemical test,' the choice of 
which is by statute, determined by the ar-
resting officer. A stated preference for 
anothe= chemical test is not a reasonable 
cause for refusal of a req~<ested test . 
•.• A person may not unilaterally determine 
one of the tests designated in subsection 
(a} of 41-6-44.10 to be unreliable; then 
on that alone, claim his refusal to submit 
to such test was with reasonable cause • 
•• . Plaintiff claims the subsection by the 
police officer, denied him a reliable test. 
Such is without merit. A chemical test 
specified by statute may not be deemed un-
reliable as a matter of law. The statute 
~pecifically designates the arresting officer 
as the one to determine the test to be ad-
ministered. (Emphasis added) . 
-3-
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The foregoing quotes demonstrate this court' . 
s ln-
terpretation of the Utah Implied Consent Statute. 
All tests i: 
dicated in the statute, including the breathalyzer t 
Est, are 
deened by law to be realiable and reasonable. 
The officer de. 
cides which test is to be taken. Nhen one is asked to submit 
to a particular test, he must, on his refusal to sub · 
reviewed to determine if the refusal was reasonable. 
ml t is ther. 
This 
court, as quoted above, said that a stated preference f 
or anotr_, 
chemical test and a fear that a particular test is 1' 
unre lable a: 
not solely reasonable causes for a refusal tc· take a p t' 
- ar lCUlar! 
test. This Appellant's only contention is, therefore, ldthout 
rr.erit. The sole fact that the blood test requested, but was 
not readily available and would have caused undue delay and ris( 
of losing the evidence, is an unreasonc:.ble ground for refusal, 
If he had some other valid reasons for refusal, the appellant 
might have been reasonable, but such is not the trial court's 
finding on the facts of this case. 
The above construction of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-4L 
I was incorporated into the code via amendment by the 1977 Utah 
Legislature. The 1977 amendments tc. this section provide in no 
uncertain terms that the officer has discretion as to whtch test! 
used and the tests are presumed to be reliable. (Breathalyzer : 
tests h.:;ve been used for· years) . Subsection A of the latest 
statute grants the right to a contemporaneous test if dE":sired. 
POINT III 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE THAT STATE 
HOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY LAWS DEAL S~HFTLY 
-4-
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AND EFFICIENTLY NITH U~SAFF DRIVERS. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Dixon v. Love, on May 16, 1977, 
~eld an Illinois law authorizing revocation or suspension of 
U, 
a drivers license without preliminary hE,arings. The court rulec1 
that holding prehearings in every case would impede administra-
tive efficiency and prove a danger to the public on the high\vays. 
This is just one example of how state courts are tightening their 
drunJ:: driving laws. The 1977 amendments to its Implied Consent 
La\v show a definite concern for public safety. The policy behind 
• 
1 
these amendments is obviously due to undue delay tactics. Keeping 
I 
stl 
the highways safe for the innocent driver seems certainly present 
10 this court's construction of the implied consent statt•tes 
even before the stattctory amendments v<ent into effect. Utah's 
'udicial decisions and legislative enactments have also reflected 
concern with the drunk driving problem. The District Court's 
finding certainly is in accord \vi th policy and holdings by this 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
This court's statutory interpretation of the applicable 
la1·1 gives the peace officer discretion as to which available 
chemical test is to be used. The facts and applicable law 
1 clearly show that Appellant's refusal to take the breathalyzer 
test was unreasonable. A refusal to take the test offered due 
to fear of its unreliability and/or a stated preference for another 
test is clearly an unreasonable refusal. 
Respondent requests this court to uphold tl:.e Trial 
findings. 
~-
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Dl'.TED this day of 
---------· 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBF.RT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt LakE City, Utah 84114 
BRUCE l1. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Mi\ILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-
Ondent this day of January, 1978, to Robert .1-1. f.1cRae, pesP ---
d Robert J. Haws, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, 370 an 
EaS t 500 south, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
BRUCE H. HALE 
Assista~t Attorney General 
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